The Pike Committee’s demands for information and Gerald Ford's Administration’s reluctance to release it almost ignited a constitutional crisis in 1975. Newly declassified documents from the National Security Archive demonstrate the highly contentious nature of this conflict, showing the CIA’s refusal to comply with the Pike Committee’s requests for information. Ultimately, when the Pike Committee was preparing to sue for the documents’ release, the CIA determined the likelihood of winning the lawsuit was remote, and Ford was able to orchestrate a compromise. The Agency would release the requested documents “on loan” to the Committee, and if there were disagreements about a specific document, the President would have the final say. The Pike Committee was then able to proceed with their investigation, and generated a report.
The final report of the Pike Committee was never officially published, due to Congressional opposition. However, unauthorized versions of the (draft) final report were leaked to the press. CBS News reporter Daniel Schorr was called to testify before Congress, but refused to divulge his source. Major portions of the report were published by The Village Voice, and a full copy of the draft was published in England.
The Pike Committee established important protocols for the declassification of intelligence documents, which would continue to evolve. It also created a precedent for the oversight of the Executive Branch and its agencies, leading to the creation of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, which now has the autonomy to declassify any of the information it receives. The Pike Committee constituted an extremely significant step in the tradition of government transparency.
PREFACE: Gregory Andrade Diamond
INTRODUCTION: Phillip Agee
PART 1. THE SELECT COMMITTEE'S OVERSIGHT EXPERIENCE
A. ACCESS TO INFORMATION
. . 1. Delay
. . 2. Cut-off
. . 3. Silenced witnesses
. . 4. Flank attack
. . . . a. An Attack Averted
. . 5. Deletions
. . 6. Privileges
. . 7. More delay
. . 8. Routine problems
. . . . a. The right question
B. CONGRESS AND THE SECRECY DILEMMA
. . 1. Oaths and agreements
. . 2. Selective briefings
. . 3. Special restrictions
. . 4. The release of information
PART 2A: INTELLIGENCE COSTS
1. Deceptive budgets
2. An absence of accountability
3. Spending abuses
. . . a. Covert Procurement
. . . b. Local Procurement
. . . c. Accommodation Procurements
. . . d. Research and Development
. . . e. Colleges and Universities
. . . f. U.S. Recording (FBI contractor for surveillance equipment)
4. Budget secrecy
PART 2B: INTELLIGENCE PERFORMANCE
1. The Tet Offensive: Failure to adapt to a new kind of war
. . . a. The Order of Battle Controversy
. . . b. The Consequences
. . . c. The Aftermath
2. Czechoslovakia: Failure of tactical warning
3. The Mid-east war -- the system breaks down
4. Portugal: the U.S. caught napping
5. India: priorities lost
6. Cyprus -- failure of intelligence and policy
7. Domestic internal security and counter-counterintelligence
. . . a. Institute for Policy Studies
8. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
9. National Security Council Intelligence Committee
10. The management and production of defense intelligence
PART 2C: INTELLIGENCE RISKS
1. Covert action
. . a. Ten Year Survey
. . b. Election Support
. . c. Media and Propaganda
. . d. Paramilitary/Arms Transfers
. . e. Organizational Support
. . f. Trends
. . g. Three Projects
2. Intelligence Collection
. . a. Submarines
. . b. Interception of International Communications
. . c. Manipulation of the Media
. . d. CIA Presence in the Executive Branch
. . e. CIA Relationships with U.S. and Foreign Police
3. Domestic intelligence investigations
. . a. Programs as Abuses
. . b. Law Enforcement Turned Law-Breaking
4. SALT -- Political control of intelligence
PART 3. COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
. . A. A HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
. . B. RELEASE OF INFORMATION
. . C. COVERT ACTION
. . D. NSA AS AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY
. . E. DISCLOSURE OF BUDGET TOTALS
. . F. PROHIBITION OF FUND TRANSFERS
. . G. DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
. . H. FULL GAO AUDIT AUTHORITY
. . I. INTERNAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
. . J. FULL DISCLOSURE TO CONGRESS
. . K. NEW FOREIGN OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF NSC
. . L. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
. . M. DETAILEES
. . N. ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
. . O. RESTRICTIONS ON POLICE TRAINING AND RELATIONSHIPS
. . P. MEDIA, RELIGION, AND EDUCATION
. . Q. RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
. . R. CLASSIFICATION
. . S. INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE
. . T. DOMESTIC
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. LES ASPIN
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. WILLIAM LEHMAN
RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. DALE MILFORD
RECOMMENDATION OF HON. MORGAN F. MURPHY
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATION OF BON. JAMES V. STANTON
ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. ROBERT McCLORY
DISSENTING AND ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF HON. DAVID C. TREEN